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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONA R. BULLOCK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT,
et a!.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12806

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Dona
R. Bullock, against the Defendants/Respondents, Herbert John Ungricht and Barbara R. Ungricht, for injuries and damages which she claims to have sustained
as the result of an automobile accident.
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the lower court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of the case was held on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th days of April, 1974, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft
1
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with a jury. On April 4, 1974 the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and a Judgment on the Verdict
was entered thereon.
The plaintiff made a Motion for a New Trial or in
the Alternative for a Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, which Motions were denied on April 18, 1974.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek to have the Order of the District Court denying the plaintiff's Motion for a New
Trial affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of an automobile accident
which occurred on December 16, 1971 at 1435 East on
33rd South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah at approximately 9:30 p.m. (R. 246-249)
The plaintiff's version of the accident was that she
made a left-hand turn onto 33rd South Street and had
planned on turning into the driveway just East of the
apartment house located at 1435 East on that street.
She claims to have activated her signal light indicating
her intention to turn into the driveway at least 150 feet
from the point where the accident occurred, but was
unable to complete the turn because of cars which had
backed up waiting for the red light at the intersection.
She indicates she had been stopped for some time with
her signal light operating when her automobile was
2
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struck from the rear, knocking it into the two westbound
lanes of traffic. (R. 251-254)
The testimony of the defendants Barbara R. Ungricht and Herbert John Ungricht was to the effect that
after they had made a left-hand turn onto 33rd South
Street from Highland Drive, they noticed the plaintiff's
automobile which appeared to be moving erratically in
that it seemed to slow down and then accelerate. At
this point the defendant Herbert John Ungricht slowed
his car until he could determine what plaintiff's automobile was going to do. They indicate there were no
cars in the westbound lanes which would have precluded
plaintiff from making a left-hand turn, however, notwithstanding this, she brought her automobile to an
abrupt stop. There was no signal from the plaintiff's
automobile indicating she was intending to stop and the
left-turn signal was not activated until her automobile
was in the process of stopping abruptly. The defendant Herbert John Ungricht applied his brakes but was
unable to avoid the accident. (R. 623-643 and D. of
Herbert John Ungricht 12-15, 30 & 39) Additionally,
there was evidence from the investigating officers that
the roadway was covered with "black ice." (R. 581, 608)
In addition to the claim for general damages, the
plaintiff sought damages for income she claimed to have
lost. (R. 185) In support of this claim, she had given
testimony on direct examination and had called several business associates as witnesses who testified extensively concerning her sales and other business abilities. (R. 296-309, 363, 367-373)
3
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In view of the substantial claim for lost income
which had been asserted by the plaintiff and the number of witnesses she had called concerning her business acumen and sales ability, questions were asked
of her on cross examination concerning the history of
her business and sales activities. Plaintiff conceded
that prior to becoming involved with Utah American
Corporation she was a sales distributor for the Inch
Master Company from 1969 until the end of 1970 and
that this was not a successful business venture and had
resulted in the filing of a Petition in Bankruptcy by her
in April of 1971. (B. 395)
This evidence was introduced in rebuttal to the
claim being made by the plaintiff for loss of income
and was admitted by the Court as being relevant to
that issue. (B. 429)
In support of the plaintiff's claim for general damages, considerable medical testimony had been introduced by her. Included in this evidence was testimony
from one of her physicians, Donald C. Bernson, M.D.,
to the effect that the plaintiff's financial and emotional
problems were the cause of her continued complaints.
(B. 354, 355) In view of the foregoing, additional questions were asked of the plaintiff on cross examination
concerning the emotional impact of the bankruptcy petition and the fact that two judgments entered against her
in that proceeding were still outstanding. (B. 396) The
plaintiff said the judgments had not been paid but
denied that this caused her any concern. (B. 397)

4
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The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgments from the Bankruptcy Court (proposed Exhibit #12-D) showed, in addition to the fact that the
judgments had not been satisfied, that the same had
been obtained by the use of misrepresentations on the
part of the plaintiff. This evidence was proffered to
the Court on the grounds that it not only related to
the credibility of the plaintiff, but was the cause of the
complaints which she continued to assert. At this time
counsel for plaintiff advised the Court that he may
wish to make further inquiry of the plaintiff concerning the reasons for the filing of the Petition in Bankruptcy by her, but conceded that he did not know what
this would show. In view of this, the Court advised
him that if this matter were opened up on direct examination, he "probably" would allow proposed Exhibit #12-D to come in. (R. 434) No further inquiry
was made concerning this subject and the Court ruled
that the exhibit would not be received. (R. 488)
The Court denied Motions for a Directed Verdict
made by the plaintiff and defendants and held that
questions of negligence and contributory negligence
were for the jury because of conflicts which existed
in the testimony of the facts surrounding the accident.
(R. 655) The Court instructed the jury on the claims
of the parties concerning the allegations of negligence
and contributory negligence and the claim for damages.
(R. 84-97) The case was submitted to the jury and
they returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action. (R. 31)

5
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER
COURT ARE PRESUMED BY THE REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE
CORRECT.
There are numerous cases from the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah, as well as other jurisdictions,
supporting the general proposition of the law stated in
Point I and no cases have been found by defendants
stating a contrary position.
There is not only a presumption of validity on appeal of the proceedings in the lower court, but the
burden is on the plaintiff affirmatively to demonstrate
error, and in the absence of such, the judgment must
be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead v. Adair,
10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah
2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. Not only are the pre-judgment
proceedings in the trial court presumed to be correct,
but every reasonable contendment must be indulged in
by the appellate court in favor of it. Burton v. Z.C.M.L,
122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 516; Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu,
17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp.,
17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30.
The proposition of law set forth in Point I is binding upon the appellate court whether the case was tried
before a judge only or to a judge sitting with a jury.
However, the presumption in favor of validity has more
weight when the trial court has given its approval to
6
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the determination of the jury as set forth in its verdict
by refusing to grant a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the losing party. See Gordon
v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430. It has also
been held that where a jury trial has been had and a
Motion for New Trial denied to the losing party, the
presumptions are in favor of the judgment entered and
the Supreme Court will not disturb that judgment unless the appellant meets the burden of showing error
and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial. Lemmon
v. Denver and Rio Grande Western RR, 9 Utah 2d 195,
341 P.2d 215.
In the case of Simpson v. General Motors Corp.,
24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399, the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah reiterated the long standing rule of the
presumption in favor of the validity of the proceedings
in the trial court and stated as follows:
"The parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their evidence and arguments upon
the issues to the court and the jury, who after
due consideration and deliberation have made
their determinations thereon. This is the objective of a trial. When it has been accomplished
the administering of evenhanded justice to both
sides demands that there should be some solidarity in the result so that it can be relied upon.
Accordingly, the established rule is that all presumptions favor the validity of the verdict and
judgment; and they will not be overturned unless the attacker shows that there is error which
is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence the result would have been different. . . . "
[Emphasis added]
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See also Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d
485; Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822;
and Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO
THE JURY.
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, there is
a sharp conflict in the evidence as to the facts surrounding the accident. The plaintiff testified that after
she had made her left turn onto 33rd South street, she
activated her signal light for a left-hand turn indicating her intention to turn into the driveway at 1435
East 33rd South. That when she came even with the
driveway she stopped in the inside lane of traffic and
had been in this position for some time waiting for
the traffic to clear which she claims was backed up
from the stop light at the intersection of 33rd South
and Highland Drive and prevented her from completing her turn. That while waiting in this position, her
automobile was struck from the rear which knocked
it into the two westbound lanes of traffic on 33rd South
street. (R, 251-254)
The testimony of the defendant Herbert John Ungricht was to the effect that after he had completed
his left-hand turn from Highland Drive onto 33rd
South street, he observed the plaintiff's automobile
ahead of him traveling at approximately the same speed
8
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as his automobile and then noticed some erratic behavior on its part in that it appeared to slow and then
accelerated. He then slowed the speed of his automobile until he could determine what movement plaintiff's
automobile was going to make. At this point the plaintiff's automobile appeared to suddenly start to make
a left-hand turn and then stopped abruptly. There was
no signal from the plaintiff's automobile that it was
going to stop and the left-turn signal was not activated
until it was stopped or in the process of stopping sharply.
(D. of Herbert John Ungricht 15, 29, 30, 33)
The defendant Barbara B. Ungricht states she saw
the plaintiff's automobile after their automobile had
completed its left-hand turn and was eastbound on 33rd
South. She noticed the automobile making some erratic movements in going slowly and then accelerating
and she made an exclamation to that effect. The plaintiff's automobile then accelerated slightly and started
to make a left-hand turn, slammed on its brakes and
stopped quickly. (E. 623) She clearly states that there
was no signal from the plaintiff's automobile indicating it would stop and/or attempt to make a left-hand
turn, and that she was looking for such a signal. (E. 630,
633,634,635)
The testimony of Herbert Pine Ungricht is substantially in accordance with that of the two defendants. At the time of the accident he was seated facing
toward the rear in the third seat of a station wagon when
he heard his wife make the exclamation concerning the erratic driving of the plaintiff's automobile. This caused
9
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him to turn his attention toward the front of the automobile and he observed the plaintiff's automobile traveling East and then it suddenly stopped with its front
end several feet across the center line. He observed
no signal from the automobile indicating that it was
intending to stop and/or make a left-hand turn. (D.
of Herbert Pine Ungricht 6, 8, 13)
Even though the defendant Herbert John Ungricht
testified that the street appeared dry (D. of Herbert
John Ungricht 8) both Deputy Sheriff Bernard Anjewierden of the iSalt Lake County Sheriff's Department
and Trooper Eobert Van leperen of the Utah Highway
Patrol, who investigated the accident, testified that the
road was slippery with what was described as " black
ice." (R. 581, 608)
It is the contention of the defendants that based
upon the conflicting testimony concerning the facts surrounding the accident, the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were properly submitted to the
jury and it could have reasonably found that the defendants were free from negligence and/or that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In this
regard the trial court stated as follows:
"I think both, with respect to the question of
negligence of the defendant driver or the question of contributory negligence, that I think it
is clear from the evidence that there is a conflict
in the evidence and when that condition exists
with respect, as I believe it does to both of these
questions, our Supreme Court has clearly stated
that it is a jury question and as so I will deny
10
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the motion and let the jury decide both the issues.' ? (B. 655)
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has repeatedly stated that where a conflict in the evidence
exists, it is proper to submit the disputed issue to the
jury and it would be error if the trial judge failed to
do so. In the case of Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196,
271 P.2d 838, the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court in submitting the issues of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury and stated as follows:
" . . . The trial court properly submitted to the
jury the questions of negligence, contributory
negligence and proximate cause, which this court
has held are ordinarily jury questions."
In the case of Best v. Ruler, 3 Utah 2d 177, 281
P.2d 208, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah amplified the proposition of law set forth herein and stated
as follows:
" I t has been frequently announced by this court
that negligence is a question for the jury unless
all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from the facts as they are shown. Shafer
v. Kelley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300,
38 A.L.E. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah
91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am.8t.Rep. 708; Baker v.
Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P.2d 679. As was said
in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58
P. 355, 358:
i

"Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of either negligence or contributory
negligence, the question is not one of law,
but of fact, and to be settled by a jury; and
this whether, the uncertainty arises from a
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conflict in the testimony, or because, the
facts being undisputed, fair-minded men will
honestly draw different conclusions from
them.""'
For other cases supporting the foregoing proposition,
see Hay den v. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P.2d 796;
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, (Utah) 249 P.2d 213, on rehearing
259 P.2d 294; and Etvan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272,
399 P.2d 210.
It is significant to note that the plaintiff did not
except to the instructions of the trial court concerning
the issues of negligence and contributory negligence
and does not raise any claim of error in connection with
the same on appeal. (B. 659)
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PETITION IN
BANKRUPTCY FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
The entire thrust of the appeal of the plaintiff is
to the effect that evidence concerning the fact that the
plaintiff had filed a Petition in Bankruptcy approximately eight months prior to the accident in question
was improper and prejudicial. This appears to be
based upon the premise that the mere filing of a Petition in Bankruptcy casts dispersions upon the integrity and credibility of the plaintiff, which resulted in
the jury being prejudiced against her.
12
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In order to determine the relevancy of the bankruptcy proceeding a review of the proceedings at the
trial must be made. The plaintiff had asserted a claim
for loss of income from the Utah American Corporation of $1,000.00 per month. This corporation was
formed in approximately November of 1971 and was
engaged in the sale of an exercise device known as the
"Inch Master", as well as hosiery. (E. 219) In support of this claim the plaintiff had testified concerning her sales abilities and had produced other witnesses
concerning this aspect of her claim, to wit: Bruce Egan
who had worked part time for the Inch Master Company as had the plaintiff (E. 362, 363); Herbert W.
DeVitt, Jr., who was a business associate of the plaintiff in Utah American Corporation in which venture he
had engaged because of plaintiff's business judgment
and ability (E. 367-373); and Eoger Stewart who was
also a business associate of plaintiff in Utah American
Corporation and who also felt the failure of this business entity was because of the plaintiff's inability to
operate the same (E. 296-309).
In view of the substantial claim which was being
made by the plaintiff for loss of income and the number of witnesses she had called in attempting to
prove this claim by showing her sales and other business abilities, the defendants sought to rebut this by
the introduction of evidence which would show that contrary to plaintiff's assertion, she had a history of business failures as opposed to successes.

13
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Plaintiff conceded that prior to becoming involved
with Utah American Corporation she was engaged in
substantially the same type of business for the Inch
Master Company from 1969 until the end of 1970 as a
sales distributor and that this was not a successful
business venture and had resulted in the filing of a
Petition in Bankruptcy by her in April of 1971. (B. 395)
After the plaintiff had answered a question concerning
the bankruptcy proceeding, her counsel objected to the
introduction of the evidence as being "irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial." The Court properly exercised its discretion concerning the evidence and overruled the plaintiff's objection to the same.
It is clear that the Court gave careful consideration to the introduction of the evidence and felt that
the same was material and relevant in view of the plaintiff's claim for loss of income and stated as follows:
"Now, it certainly seems to me that when she
puts on all of these witnesses who testify about
her sales ability and the fact that was going to
be such a big success and she is going to make
a thousand dollars a month income, the proof
she in fact just nine months before, while operating a similar type of business activity, ended
up in the Bankruptcy Court, I think is very material and relevant evidence concerning a rebuttal of the claims made by her witnesses that
have been testifying in this trial.
#

*

#

"Now, however, I don't agree with your contention that the probative value of this information about her bankruptcy is substantially outweighed by the risk that it might have with re14
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spect to undue consumption of time, creation of
a substantial danger of prejudice or to constitute any element of surprise. I don't see how
she can claim prejudice with respect to this sort
of testimony when she has presented her four
or five witnesses, including herself on this very
point. And, therefore, I don't think that in any
sense of the word, the discretion provided for
in Eule 45 is to be exercised by me in this case
because I think clearly that it is material and
relevant to the issues involved."
The foregoing ruling of the Court is patently correct
and in this regard 22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, Sections
315 and 317 provide in part as follows:
"Generally, the plaintiff may put in evidence
his actual earnings for a reasonable period before the injury and his actual earnings, if any,
after the injury. This is true whether his earnings were in the form of wages or salary, commissions, or profits. . . . Such evidence is admissible not because it is the amount to which
plaintiff is entitled, but rather, because it is
evidence of plaintiff's earning ability. . . . On
the other hand, if for any particular reason the
plaintiff would not have earned any wages had
he not been injured, this fact may be shown in
diminution of the damages.
" . . . as a general rule, where a claim is made
for loss of wages, impairment of earning capacity, or loss of future earnings, facts may be
shown concerning the plaintiff's habits or conduct which might throw light on the probability
of his securing employment, such as his business
and other habits, including his habits of economy." [Emphasis added]
15
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In the instant action it is clear that the plaintiff's business failure which had resulted in the bankruptcy proceeding filed by her wras relevant and material to the
claim being asserted by her and she can scarcely now
claim that the admission of this fact unduly prejudiced
her.
In addition to the claim for loss of income the plaintiff had asserted a claim for general damages for the
injuries which she claimed to have sustained in the accident. However, there was substantial evidence to the
effect that at least a portion of the complaints which
were being made by the plaintiff were not accident related and were caused as a result of the emotional
upset from which she was suffering which resulted from
family and financial problems. In this regard, Donald
C. Bernson, M.D., one of the physicians who had treated
the plaintiff and whom she had called at the trial conceded that he could find nothing wrong with the plaintiff in 1973 and the records from the Cottonwood Hospital, Salt Lake County, Utah which were prepared by
him, provided as follows:
" . . . It was subsequently noted there had been
a great deal of emotional and financial problems
present recently in patient's home life, especially
back about the time of the present symptoms
began. After exhausting all avenues of investigation, the findings, et cetera, were discussed in
detail with the patient and attempts were made
to assure her that no serious or abnormal condition existed and she was discharged from the
hospital on her sixth day.
#

*

*
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" Primary diagnosis — Cause of Admission —
I diagnosed her as ' anxiety reaction with psychophysical neuromuscular reaction.' " (R. 354, 355)
In connection with the bankruptcy proceeding, two
creditors of the plaintiff had filed suit against her
claiming she had incurred obligations to them based
upon misrepresentations which she had made. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment from
the Bankruptcy Court were included in proposed Exhibit 12-D which was submitted to the Court. (R. 412)
This evidence was proffered to the Court on the grounds
that it not only related to the credibility of the plaintiff but was the cause of the complaints which she continued to assert. (R. 415) It would seem obvious that
a judgment obtained against a person based on misrepresentations on her part which remained unsatisfied
even as of the time of trial, would very likely be emotionally upsetting to that person and in this instance
the plaintiff's own physician had conceded that in his
judgment such emotional upsets were the probable cause
of the complaints which she continued to assert.
At this point counsel for the plaintiff indicated
that he wished to go into the reasons behind the fact
that the plaintiff filed the Petition in Bankruptcy, but
conceded he did not know what this would show. (R. 431)
The Court advised him that if he wanted to go into
the matter of the bankruptcy further, he would " probably" allow proposed Exhibit 12-D to be received. (R.
434) No further inquiry was made concerning the bankruptcy and the exhibit was not received. (R. 488)
17
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Even if the Court had received proposed Exhibit
12-D, it would not have been improper. In this regard,
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in part
as follows:
"'. . . (c) evidence of traits of his character
other than truth, honesty, or integrity or their
opposites, shall be inadmissable; (d) evidence
of specific instances of his conduct relevant only
as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall
be inadmissible." [Emphasis added]
As was noted above, the proposed Exhibit 12-D
was sougfht to be introduced not only to test the plaintiff's credibility, but on the issue of the complaints
which she continued to assert which her own physician
had testified were caused in part by the financial problems she had experienced and was continuing to experience. Thus, even if its introduction had been precluded on the claim of credibility, it would not have
been barred under the provisions of Rule 22 because of
its relevance in connection with the claim for damages.
Notwithstanding the position of the defendants that
proposed Exhibit 12-D could have been properly received, the position of the plaintiff concerning the same
is rendered moot in view of the Court's ruling that the
exhibit should not be received. (R. 487, 488)
It should also be noted that plaintiff's contention
that the Petition in Bankruptcy somehow stigmatized
or prejudiced her in the eyes of the jury is completely
without factual or legal foundation. The record is completely void of any inference by the Court that it con18
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sidered bankruptcy as a "dirty word" as alleged by
plaintiff in her Brief. To imply that the Court in this
case viewed the fact that plaintiff had filed a Petition
in Bankruptcy in and of itself as impuning her integrity or would cause one to question her credibility is entirely unwarranted and not supported by the record.
Likewise, the record is completely void of any statement by the Court or argument by counsel to the jury
that the fact that the plaintiff had filed a Petition in
Bankruptcy should cause them to question her credibility. Conversely, the Court instructed the jury that
they were to be entirely impartial in their deliberations
and Instruction No. 1 provides in part as follows:
"The law forbids you to let sentiment, sympathy or prejudice influence you in your deliberations. Each party expects that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and
weigh the evidence and apply the law of the
case thereto, and that you will reach a just verdict, regardless of what the consequences of such
verdict may be." (R. 75)
The plaintiff, in her Brief on appeal, cites no cases
in support of the proposition espoused by her that the
introduction of evidence of a Petition in Bankruptcy
filed by a party would in any way be harmful or could
conceivably constitute prejudicial error. All of the
cases cited by plaintiff in her Brief differ with matters widely different from a bankruptcy proceeding such
as: the homosexual tendency of a party in United States
v. John David Provoo, (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F.2d 531;
the automobile thefts which had been perpetrated by
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the plaintiff in Warren v. Hynes, (Wash. 1940) 102
P,2d 691; the arrest record for disorderly conduct of
a party in Sanford v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 44,
98 F.2d 325 (1938); the evidence of the communist affilations of a party in Commomvealth v. Truitt, 39 Pa.
72, 85 A.2d 425, 30 A.L.R. 2d 572; the arrest of the
defendant for lewd conduct in People v. Hurlburt, 166
Cal. App. 2d 334, 33 P.2d 82, 85 A.L.R.2d 500; the
arrest record of a party for assault in Hockaday v.
Redline, Inc., 85 U.S. App. D. C. 1, 174 F. 2d 154; the
conviction of a party in a false bomb threat in Smith
v. United States, (6th Cir. 1960) 283 F.2d 16; and the
fact that parties had engaged in illegal gambling on
the night of the accident in Champion v. Brooks Transportation Co., 11 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 135 F.2d 652.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
As set forth herein, it is the position of the defendants that no error was committed by the trial
court, however, if any such error was committed, it
was not prejudicial to the plaintiff.
It is clearly the law of this state that the granting
or denying of a Motion for New Trial is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court and the trial court
will be presumed to have acted properly unless the contrary can clearly be shown. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle,
4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867.
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I t is also clear that even though the trial court
a n d / o r the appellate court may have ruled differently
had they been the trier of fact in the case, a jury verdict may not be set aside on this basis as it would be
the usurpation of the constitutional right of trial by
jury. Uptown Appliance v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249
P.2d 826.
The case of Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261,
409 P.2d 121, involved an action for personal injuries
arising out of an automobile accident and the issue of
liability insurance was injected into the trial. In affirming the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff and
the ruling of the trial court in denying the Motion for
a New Trial, the Supreme Court addressed itself to
the discretionary functions of the trial court and stated
as follows:
" . . . It is the responsibility of the trial court
to rule upon questions which arise concerning
whether any such occurrence has prevented a
party from having a fair trial; and to take whatever corrective measure he deems necessary, including the granting of a mistrial where that is
required. Due to the fact that this is primarily
his responsibility; and that he is in a position
of advantage to observe the appearance, demeanor and reactions of all persons concerned,
and the result which eventuates, his rulings on
such matters should be looked upon with indulgence and should not be disturbed unless it clearly
appears that he has abused his discretion.''
The Court indicated that even though the injection of
the issue of liability insurance into the trial was im21
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proper, it did not prevent the parties from having a
fair trial. See also Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d
8, 354 P.2d 564.
It should be noted that in this instance plaintiff
sought to bolster her Motion for a New Trial by an Affidavit from her counsel concerning conversations which
he had had with two of the jurors who told him they
had discussed the plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding in
their deliberations. This Affidavit was clearly improper
and the Court properly declined to consider the same
and entered an Order to this effect in denying the
Motion for a New Trial. (R. 20) For cases supporting
the proposition that Affidavits such as this which go
into the deliberations of the jury are improper, see
Wheat v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR, 122 Utah
418, 250 P.2d 938; Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240,
408 P.2d 709 and Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33,
439P.2d850.
In this case the parties have had an opportunity
to present their cases to the Court and the jury found
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff
on conflicting evidence and the Court declined to upset
the verdict of the jury. In view of the foregoing, it
seems that the following much quoted proposition is
applicable:
"Anyone acquainted with the practical operation of a trial by jury and the human factors
that must play a part therein is aware that it;
would be almost impossible to complete a trial
of any length without some things occurring with
which counsel, after the case is lost, can find
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fault and, in zeal for his cause, all quite in good
faith, magnify into error which to him and the
losing parties seems blameable for their failure
to prevail. However, from the standpoint of administering evenhanded justice the court must
dispassionately survey such claims against the
over-all picture of the trial, and if the parties
have been afforded an opportunity to fully and
fairly present their evidence and arguments upon
the issues, and the jury has made its determination thereon, the objective of the proceeding has
been accomplished. And the judgment should
not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is
error which is substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that it appears that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different in the absence of such error. . . . " Hales
v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822
CONCLUSION
In the instant action conflicting evidence existed
concerning the facts surrounding the accident giving
rise to the plaintiff's claim for damages and in view of
this the Court properly submitted the questions of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury. The
jurors, as the finders of fact, saw all of the witnesses,
heard their testimony, considered their demeanor and
made a determination on the weight to give each witness and his testimony and after considering all, found
for the defendants and against the plaintiff on this issue.
The plaintiff asserted a substantial claim for loss
of income and produced several witnesses in support
of this claim who testified extensively concerning her
business abilities. In light of this claim, the defendants
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properly produced evidence concerning the fact that the
plaintiff's business acumen and sales ability were not
as she contended them to be as shown by her business
failure just shortly prior to the accident in question
which had resulted in the bankruptcy proceedings. Such
evidence was clearly relevant and material in view of
the claim for loss of earnings which had been asserted.
The contention of the plaintiff that the fact that
she had filed a Petition in Bankruptcy prejudiced her
in the eyes of the jury is without any factual or legal
support, and its probative value was clearly weighed
by the Court at the time the same was introduced and
thereafter in denying the plaintiff's Motion for a New
Trial.
Based upon the foregoing, defendants urge this
Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court based
upon the jury verdict and its Order denying plaintiff's
Motion for a New Trial.
Respectfully submitted,
J. Anthony Eyre
Kipp and Christian
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Kespondents to Orrin G. Hatch and Winston Langlois, Attorneys
for Plaintiff/Appellant, 420 Continental Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 9th day of May, 1975.
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